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ABSTRACT 
The antisaccade task requires participants to inhibit the reflexive tendency to look at a sudden 
onset target and instead direct their gaze to the opposite hemifield. As such it provides a 
convenient tool with which to investigate the cognitive and neural systems that support goal-
directed behaviour. Recent models of cognitive control suggest that antisaccade performance 
on a single trial should vary as a function of the outcome (correct antisaccade or erroneous 
prosaccade) of the previous trial. In addition, repetition priming effects suggest that the spatial 
location of the target on the previous trial may also influence current trial performance. Thus 
an analysis of contingency effects in antisaccade performance may provide new insights into 
the factors that influence the monitoring and modulation of the antisaccade task and other 
ongoing behaviours. Using a multilevel modelling analysis we explored previous trial effects 
on current trial performance in a large antisaccade dataset. We found (1) repetition priming 
effects following correct antisaccades; (2) contrary to models of cognitive control antisaccade 
error rates were increased on trials following an error, suggesting that failures to adequately 
maintain the task goal can persist across more than one trial; and (3) current trial latencies 
varied according to the previous trial outcome (correct antisaccade, slowly corrected error or 
rapidly corrected error). These results are discussed in terms of current models of antisaccade 
performance and cognitive control and further demonstrate the utility of multilevel modelling 
for providing a powerful statistical technique for analysing antisaccade data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Complex behaviour requires the monitoring of ongoing action and subsequent behavioural 
adjustment in order to prevent, detect and (if necessary) correct erroneous responses (Dehaene 
et al., 2003; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, Kergsberg & Changeux, 1998; Mayr, 
2004; Mayr, Awh & Laurey, 2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001). This monitoring – or cognitive 
control - is particularly important when execution of the correct behavioural response requires 
the suppression of an over-learned or otherwise pre-potent response.  In circumstances such as 
these, “action slips” may occur, particularly if we are distracted or otherwise fail to 
adequately maintain the original goal or intention (e.g., James 1890; Norman, 1981; Reason, 
1984). A convenient laboratory analogue of action slips is provided by the antisaccade task 
(Hallett, 1978). Observers are required to suppress a highly pre-potent prosaccade towards a 
sudden onset target and instead make an eye movement in the opposite direction, often to an 
equidistant position in the opposite hemifield. Healthy participants typically fail to suppress 
erroneous prosaccades towards the target on about 20-25% of trials, before correctly 
saccading towards the mirror image location (e.g., Fischer & Weber, 1992; Smyrnis et al, 
2002).  
Comparatively few studies have systematically explored the processes involved in 
monitoring and adjusting performance during saccadic eye movement tasks on a trial by trial 
basis. Those that do have focussed on repetition priming effects – the extent to which 
repeating the stimulus location and/or saccade direction from one trial to the next impacts on 
performance (Fecteau, Au, Armstrong & Munoz, 2004; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, 
Band & Kok, 2001; Barton, Goff & Manoach, 2006). Current models of cognitive control 
suggest that our response to the outcome of the previous trial (e.g., correct or error) may also 
impact on current trial performance (Botvinick et al, 2001). An example of such behaviour 
from reaction time tasks is  “post-error slowing” - a shift in the trade off between speed and 
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accuracy to a more cautious response mode which occurs on the trial following an erroneous 
response (Botvinick et al, 2001; Hodgson et al, 2004; Rabbitt, 1966; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 
1977). A critical distinction between two currently influential accounts of cognitive control 
concerns the role of conscious awareness. According to the conflict monitoring model 
outlined by Miller & Cohen (2001) the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior 
cingulated cortex (ACC) comprise a closed feedback circuit, with the ACC signalling for 
increased cognitive control from the DLPFC whenever conflict is detected (either consciously 
or unconsciously). In contrast, according to Dehaene et al’s account (Dehaene et al., 2003; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 1998), neural and behavioural indications of 
increased cognitive control should be observed only when conscious awareness of conflict is 
high (Mayr, 2004).  
The antisaccade task provides an excellent opportunity to test specific predictions 
arising from these two alternative accounts of cognitive control, as it has recently been 
demonstrated that participants are unaware of around 50% of the errors they make (Mokler & 
Fischer, 1999; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). Both recognised and unrecognised errors are usually 
corrected by one or more saccades in the opposite direction to the initial prosaccade, but 
recognised (conscious) errors are typically corrected more slowly than unrecognised 
(unconscious) errors.  Research using other paradigms has suggested that errors that are 
corrected rapidly are dissociable from those that are corrected more slowly both in terms of 
conscious awareness and electrophysiological responses (Rodriguez-Fornells, Kurzbuch & 
Münte, 2002; Fiehler, Ullsperger & Cramon, 2005).  These previous studies have, however,  
only considered these differences within the timecourse of a single trial.  
In addition to changes in control afforded by conflict monitoring or error detection 
systems, other factors have been shown to influence antisaccade performance on a trial by 
trial basis. In particular, given that the antisaccade task employs stimuli that are typically 
distinguished only by hemisphere of presentation and occasionally by eccentricity, certain 
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“repetition priming” effects, (whereby the processing of a given stimulus is facilitated if it 
occurred on a previous trial) may be expected (Mayr et al., 2003; Soetens, 1998; Fecteau & 
Munoz, 2003; Fecteau, et al., 2004; Barton et al., 2006). For example, in a simple prosaccade 
task, Dorris, Paré and Munoz (2000) demonstrated that saccadic latencies in non-human 
primates are reduced if the target occurs in the same spatial location as on a previous trial, and 
increased if it occurs in the diametrically opposite position. In humans, the opposite pattern 
has been observed; latencies are increased if the stimulus is repeated, but reduced if the 
hemifield of presentation alternates between trials (Fecteau et al, 2004; Barton et al., 2006).  
The research outlined above suggests that a variety of factors may influence ongoing 
performance during the antisaccade task. Models of cognitive control suggest that increased 
control following erroneous trials may result in post-error slowing, and an increased 
likelihood of a correct response. Repetition priming effects suggest that the spatial location of 
the target on the preceding trial may also impact on current trial performance. Current models 
of antisaccade performance (e.g., Munoz & Everling, 2004) allow for both of these effects to 
be mediated via changes in the baseline activity in the neural systems mediating saccadic 
responses, but only repetition priming effects have been investigated. The purpose of the 
present study was to determine the effects of, and interactions between these factors on 
antisaccade performance in a large sample of trials. An increased understanding of the role of 
these processes would provide further insights into why antisaccade errors are increased in 
certain patient populations, and also inform current models of cognitive control. 
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METHOD 
Participants. Ninety undergraduates from the University of Sussex contributed data for this 
study. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. Participants were naïve to the purposes 
of this study. All participants provided written consent. The study was carried out in accord 
with the principles laid down in the Helsinki Declaration and was approved by the School of 
Life Sciences Ethics Committee. 
 
Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed using a Viewsonic P225f 22” pure flat CRT monitor at a 
resolution of 1,280 x 1,024 pixels, with a refresh rate of 85 Hz. Participants viewed the 
stimuli from a distance of  approximately 60 cm. Eye movements were recorded using an SR 
Research Ltd., EyeLink II eye tracker, with a temporal resolution of 2 ms and a spatial 
resolution better than 0.25 degrees. A 3-point horizontal target array was used for eye tracker 
calibration. A second 3-point array was used to validate this calibration.  
 
The antisaccade task. Prior to each experiment, the participants were instructed that when the 
peripheral target appeared they should not look at it but should instead move their eyes as 
quickly and as accurately as possible to the mirror-image location (an equal distance from 
central fixation but in the opposite direction). Each trial began with the presentation of a 
central fixation marker (a filled red circle measuring 0.5 degrees of visual angle in diameter, 
luminance 15 cd/m), on a black background (average luminance 4.2 cd/m). After a brief 
period the central marker was extinguished and there followed a 200 ms period in which the 
screen was blank (the gap period). The period before the central marker was extinguished 
allowed a drift-correct procedure to be performed and varied between 600 ms and 3,100 ms. 
After the 200 ms gap, a peripheral target appeared (another filled red circle measuring 0.5 
degrees in diameter) in one of four locations: –8 degrees, -4 degrees, +4 degrees and +8 
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degrees from the position at which the central fixation marker had been displayed. The target 
remained on screen for 2000 ms. The location at which the stimulus appeared was varied 
randomly, with an equal probability of appearing in any of the four possible locations. Figure 
1 shows a schematic of an antisaccade trial. Participants each contributed data from between 
two and eight blocks of 72 antisaccade trials. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Data analysis. Analysis was carried out off-line after completion of the experiment. Initial 
extraction of the eye position data was carried out using software supplied with the EyeLink 
II eye tracking system: Saccade detection required a deflection of greater than 0.1º, with a 
minimum velocity of 30ºs-1 and a minimum acceleration of 8000ºs-2, maintained for at least 4 
ms. No minimum fixation duration criterion was imposed. Further analysis was conducted 
using custom software developed within the MATLAB programming environment. Trials 
were excluded if the centre of gaze was not within 50 pixels (approximately 1.25 degrees) of 
the central fixation marker when the peripheral target appeared as an eccentric position of 
gaze when the target appeared would confound our study of the influence of target location. 
Trials were also excluded if saccades were initiated within 80 ms of the appearance of the 
peripheral target as these are unlikely to have been generated in response to the target, even 
given express saccade latencies (e.g., Fischer and Weber, 1993; Wenban-Smith and Findlay, 
1991); such rapidly initiated saccades are likely to be anticipatory. Trials were also excluded 
if no eye movements were initiated within two seconds of the appearance of the peripheral 
target. As a result of these selection criteria, a total 21,901 trials were available for subsequent 
analysis. 
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Statistical analysis. In traditional analyses of antisaccade data, the relevant performance 
indices (e.g., error rate, average correct antisaccade latency, average primary saccade 
amplitude, etc.) are calculated individually for each participant, and these values submitted to 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). By aggregating across trials and treating the participant as the 
unit of analysis, potentially interesting trial level information is lost. Even if trial level data 
are not the focus of the analysis, it is worth noting that this standard ANOVA approach treats 
means based on a single trial or small number of trials (for example for correct antisaccade 
latency if the participant only makes one or two correct responses) as precise, and given equal 
weight to a mean based on a substantial number of trials. Techniques based upon analyses of 
variance therefore become particularly problematic for data in which the number of samples 
contributed by individuals varies widely, as in the present study. 
In this paper we were primarily concerned with how the performance of the 
antisaccade task on the current trial is influenced by the previous trial. This type of analysis 
requires that each trial is treated as an individual data point, rather than using participant 
means. Treating individual trials as data points in a traditional ANOVA violates the 
assumption of independence, as some participants make more errors than others, and average 
saccade latency varies across subjects. Treating trials as a repeated measures factor takes such 
dependencies into account, but leads to excessively complex models (when the number of 
trials is large), and the model must be balanced in that all participants must contribute the 
same number of repeated observations. An appropriate technique for an analysis of this type 
is to use multilevel models, also known as hierarchical linear models or random coefficient 
models (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995). This approach recognises the 
hierarchical nature of many datasets, and is ideal for analysing data from tasks such as the 
antisaccade, where trials are nested within participants.  In particular this technique is robust 
to missing data points, and does not require similar numbers of observations in each cell of 
the experimental design. It should be noted that our multilevel modelling approach does not 
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forfeit ANOVA’s advantage of being able to generalise across participants: Participants are 
treated as a random variable, and as such the analysis allows generalisation across the 
participant population, and to participants in general. 
The basic multilevel model is similar to the standard linear model  
ijijij exy ++= 10 ββ          (1) 
where dependent variable y is a function of predictor variable x. The subscripts indicate a 
repeated measures type model where the responses of several individuals (j) are measured on 
several different occasions (i). 0β is the intercept and 1β  the regression coefficient. The error 
associated with each observation in terms of the difference between its actual value and that 
predicted by the regression coefficients is represented by ije  (the residuals). In conventional 
regression models the coefficients are fixed and have the same value for each participant. In 
multilevel, or hierarchical models, the regression coefficients are free to vary between 
participants. In the multilevel approach the model is modified to allow different participants 
to have different slopes and intercepts ( β ): 
ijijjijjij exuxuy ++++= 1100 ββ        (2) 
In this equation ju0  and ju1  are random quantities and represent participant j’s deviation from 
the average 0β  and 1β  respectively. For repeated measures data a simple random intercept 
model is sufficient:  
ijijjij exuy +++= 100 ββ         (3) 
The first level of the analysis (i) represents the trial, and the second level (j) the participant. 
The intercept term varies randomly across participants and the effects of the explanatory 
variables are assumed to be constant across participants. In multilevel models explanatory 
variables can be measured at each level. In the present analysis all explanatory variables are at 
the trial level, but the approach can also accommodate participant level variables, and their 
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interaction with trial level variables, making it suitable for research comparing antisaccade 
performance in different populations (such as patients versus controls). A further advantage of 
ML models, particularly relelvant for antisaccade data, is that they can easily accommodate 
binomial data (such as trial outcome: correct vs error). For binomial data the model uses a 
multilevel logistic regression.  
All analyses were conducted using MLwiN (version 2.0, Multilevels Model Project, 
Institute of Education, University of Bristol). Significance testing was performed with log-
likelihood ratio tests that compare nested models with reduced models that do not include the 
variables of interest. The likelihood ratio test follows a chi-square distribution, with q degrees 
of freedom, where q is the difference in the number of parameters between the two models.  
Initially we considered general antisaccade performance characteristics for our data 
set. We measured error rate, primary saccade latency, and the latency with which prosaccade 
errors were corrected (as measured from the offset of the erroneous prosaccade). All primary 
saccades that met the criteria for saccade detection were included in the analysis. For our 
analysis of contingency effects in the antisaccade task, we created a number of binary dummy 
variables to code the variables of interest. In order to establish whether any apparent effects of 
the previous trial resulted from longer term trends such as learning or fatigue we coded trials 
within each block as either first half or second half. There were no significant effects of this 
variable on either error rate or latency so for clarity and simplicity is not included in the 
analyses presented below. The other dummy variables were current trial outcome (coded as 
either correct or error), previous trial outcome (also coded as correct or error) and target 
hemifield congruency: i.e. whether the target on the current trial appears in the same 
hemifield as on the previous trial (coded as congruent or incongruent).  
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RESULTS 
General performance metrics 
The average error rate was 24.1% (SD = 8.2). This is comparable with previous 
studies (e.g., Evdokimidis et al., 2002; Everling & Fischer, 1998; Mokler & Fischer, 1999). 
Participants made more errors when the target appeared to the right of fixation (26.2% of 
trials) than when it appeared on the left (22.1%; χ2(1) =49.173, p < 0.01) This finding is 
consistent with the majority of recent reports (e.g., Bell, Everling & Munoz, 2000; Smyrnis et 
al., 2002).  
 
As expected, erroneous prosaccades had shorter latencies (M = 139.0, SD = 28.6 ms) 
than correct antisaccades (M = 239.0 ms, SD = 38.1 ms, ; χ2(1) = 11842, p < 0.01). The 
increase in latencies observed for correct antisaccades is generally assumed to reflect the 
additional processing involved in inhibiting the reflexive prosaccade and performing the 
spatial transform required to provide the co-ordinates for the antisaccade, although the relative 
importance of these processes remains unclear (Evdokimidis et al., 2002; Olk & Kingstone, 
2002, 2003). When compared to the baseline model, target hemifield had no impact on 
primary saccade latency. However, compared to a model containing the effects of current trial 
and target hemifield, a model containing their interaction led to a significant improvement in 
model fit (χ2(1) = 41.0, p<0.01): Correct antisaccades were made slightly more quickly if the 
target appeared in the left hemifield (236.3 ms) than if it appeared on the right (241.9 ms). 
Conversely, antisaccade errors had a shorter latency if the target appeared in the right 
hemifield (136.5 ms) than if it appeared on the left (141.9 ms). An antisaccade away from a 
target in the left hemifield is a rightward eye movement. Similarly a prosaccade toward a 
target in the right hemifield is a rightward movement. Thus in both cases latencies were 
shorter when the eye movement that was initiated was rightward. Although the interaction is 
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significant, it is worth noting that the differences are very small (around 5 ms or less) and are 
perhaps unlikely to be of particular behavioural significance.  
When erroneous prosaccades were generated, they were corrected by a saccade in the 
opposite direction before the end of the trial in 99.5% of cases. The mean latency before these 
errors were corrected was 131.4 ms (SD = 54.8) consistent with previous research 
(Evdokimidis et al., 2002; Massen, 2004; Mokler & Fischer, 1999). Like these previous 
studies, we found that a considerable proportion of these correction latencies were very short: 
60.3% of the errors were corrected within 120 ms and 27.3% were corrected within 80 ms.  
 
Trial-by-trial contingencies 
 
Recent evidence suggests that errors can have differential effects both within and beyond the 
time course of a trial. Mokler and Fischer (1999) found that errors that the participant is aware 
of making tend to have longer correction latencies than those that they are unaware of. 
Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 
1998) argue that increased cognitive control should only occur after errors of which the 
participant is aware. In order to explore the possibility of differential inter-trial effects for 
errors in the antisaccade task (and in the absence of subjective feedback from participants), 
we split our errors into two groups based on the mean latencies for recognised and 
unrecognised errors described by Mokler & Fischer, 1999 – rapidly corrected (<80 ms) or 
slowly corrected (>150 ms). 
 
Error rates 
Our analysis of error rates compared the effects of, and the interactions between 
previous trial outcome and hemifield congruence. Previous trial outcome specified whether 
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the primary response on the previous trial was a correct antisaccade, a rapidly corrected 
erroneous prosaccade or a slowly corrected erroneous prosaccade. The incidence of errors 
varied according to the outcome of the previous trial (χ2(2) = 18.0, p < 0.01). Antisaccade 
errors were lower if the previous trial was a correct antisaccade (22.9%), compared to an error 
that was corrected within 80 ms (26.4%; χ2(1) = 7.69, p < 0.01, N = 1353 errors) or an error 
that was corrected with a latency in excess of 150 ms (27.6%; χ2(1) = 11.72, p < 0.01, N = 
1066 errors). The difference in error rates following slowly- and quickly-corrected errors was 
not significant χ2(1) = 0.4. We accept that our boundaries of 80 ms and 150 ms are essentially 
arbitrary. The analyses were repeated with several alternative boundaries, both wider and 
narrower, and the critical findings remained significant. 
 
Error rates also varied with hemifield congruence (χ2(1) = 73.8, p < 0.01) with errors 
occurring less often if the target appeared in the same hemifield as on previous trials (21.0%) 
compared to trials on which it appeared in a different hemifield on the previous trial (26.2%).  
The interaction between hemifield congruence and previous trial outcome was also significant 
χ
2(2) = 6.02, p < 0.05 (Table 1). On trials following a correct antisaccade, error rates were 
lower if the target appeared in the same hemifield as it had on the previous trial (19.9%) than 
if it appeared in the opposite hemifield (25.7%). There were no effects of hemifield 
congruence on trials following a rapidly corrected error or on trials following a slowly 
corrected error. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Primary saccade latency 
A model containing the parameter coding for current trial outcome (correct vs. error) 
was used as the baseline model. Models containing previous trial outcome (χ2(2) = 31.7, p < 
0.01), and the interaction between previous and current trial outcome (χ2(2) = 79.6, p < 0.01) 
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both led to a significant increase in model fit. As can be seen in Figure 2, the interaction 
occurs because the previous trial outcome has opposite effects on the latency of correct 
antisaccades and erroneous prosaccades. For correct antisaccades on the current trial (Figure 
2, left), the latency was 239.6 ms if the previous trial outcome was also a correct antisaccade. 
However, for correct antisaccades on trials following a rapidly corrected error on the previous 
trial, this latency reduced to 224.6 ms. Conversely, for correct antisaccades on trials following 
slowly corrected errors on the previous trial, latency increased to 248.2 ms. When the current 
trial outcome was an erroneous prosaccade (Figure 2, right), the latency of this response was 
139.2 ms if the previous trial outcome was a correct antisaccade. For error prosaccades on 
trials following a rapidly corrected error on the previous trial, this latency increased to 145.7 
ms. for error prosaccades on trials following a slowly corrected error on the previous trial the 
latency of the erroneous prosaccade was reduced to130.0 ms. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The only other model that led to a significant reduction in the log likelihood ratio compared to 
the baseline model of current trial outcome, was a model that included the interaction between 
hemifield congruency and current trial outcome. The interaction occurs because correct 
antisaccades are slightly slower if the target appears in the opposite hemifield to the previous 
trial (240.3 ms) than if it appears in the same hemifield (237.8 ms); whereas, antisaccade 
errors are slightly faster if the target appears in the opposite hemifield to the previous trial 
(137.1 ms) than if it appears in the same hemifield (142.3 ms). Hemifield congruency did not 
interact with previous trial outcome. 
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 DISCUSSION 
 
A contingency analysis of a large sample of antisaccade trials revealed three key findings. 
First, repetition priming effects were observed following correct antisaccades. Second, we 
found that antisaccade error rates were increased on trials following an error. Third, current 
trial latencies varied according to the previous trial outcome (correct antisaccade, slowly 
corrected error or rapidly corrected error).  
 
Repetition priming in the antisaccade task 
 
Following a correct antisaccade, if the target appeared in the same hemifield on the next trial, 
the error rate was low and the primary saccade latency for correct antisaccades was also 
slightly reduced. This result suggests that when an antisaccade program is executed, 
activation within that pathway may remain elevated for the subsequent trial. Thus there is 
facilitation of that pathway (an antisaccade in a particular direction) in the following trial. 
Such a priming effect is consistent with previous reports of repetition priming (Dorris et al., 
2000; Mayr et al., 2003; Soetens, 1998). That this particular repetition priming effect is 
confined to trials following correct antisaccades is not unexpected: On error trials both the 
incorrect program (the prosaccade) and the correct antisaccade are executed, thus making a 
selective priming of one of these pathways in the next trial unlikely. Barton, Goff and 
Manaoch (2006) found repetition priming effecst on pro and antisaccade latencies, but these 
were related to the penultimate trial (N-2), not the previous trial (N-1). 
 A recent account of antisaccade performance assumes that a “competition” ensues at 
stimulus onset between the exogenously triggered prosaccade and the endogenously initiated 
antisaccade (e.g., Munoz & Everling, 2004; Massen, 2004); the pathway that reaches 
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threshold first is executed (see Mokler & Fischer, 1999; Schlag-Rey, Amador, Sanchez & 
Schlag, 1997; Trappenberg, Dorris, Munoz & Klein, 2001). Reaching threshold for either 
pathway can be modified either by changing the rate at which activation of the pathway rises 
to threshold, or the baseline activation in the pathway prior to stimulus onset (see Carpenter, 
1981; Carpenter & Williams, 1995; Hanes & Carpenter, 1999). Variations in baseline 
activation have been suggested for simple reflexive saccadic tasks: inter-trial effects have 
been interpreted as reflecting residual activation in topographic salience maps that persist 
beyond the duration of a single trial (Fecteau and Munoz, 2003). Dorris and colleagues 
(Dorris & Munoz, 1995; Dorris, Taylor, Klein & Munoz, 1999; Dorris et al., 2000) suggested 
that inter-trial variations in baseline activation is not limited to a topographic salience map: 
location-independent “pre-target factors” can also result in variations in the baseline activity 
for particular saccadic programs, upon which post-target activity accumulates. It is possible 
that our observed repetition priming effect reflects increased activity in the antisaccade 
pathway for one particular hemifield, facilitating correct antisaccade if the target appears in 
the same hemifield on the next trial. 
Between each trial, one or more saccades were made to return the centre of gaze to the 
central pre-trial marker. Given that most errors are followed by an antisaccade to the mirror 
location, the final re-centring saccade almost always takes the form of a saccade from the 
target’s mirror location to the centre of the display. It may be that some of the observed 
priming effects arise from this return saccade rather than the initial response by the observer. 
Since the occurrence of this return saccade was not manipulated, it is not possible to untangle 
the potential influence of this from the influence of the initial response. However, because we 
find differential inter-trial effects depending upon the outcome of the previous trial, yet the 
return saccade is relatively constant across different previous trial outcomes, we feel that the 
reported results are unlikely to arise solely from the return saccade. 
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Increased error rates after errors 
 
Executing an erroneous prosaccade on the previous trial resulted in an increased probability 
of making another error on the current trial. There are two possible explanations for this 
result: priming of the error response pathway, or prolonged goal neglect.  
Executing an erroneous prosaccade rather than an antisaccade suggests that the 
prosaccade pathway received more activation than the antisaccade pathway on the previous 
trial. It would appear that this pathway may remain primed for the next trial and therefore 
increase the probability of the erroneous prosaccade reaching threshold before the correct 
response. Interestingly, this priming effect in the erroneous pathway is not location- (or 
direction-) specific, but is a general priming of the erroneous stimulus-driven response.  
An alternative explanation to our suggestion of error-response-priming is that 
successive errors result from a transient failure to adequately maintain the goal of the task. 
That is, rather than the previous error resulting in elevated baseline activation in the 
prosaccade pathway on the current trial, goal neglect could result in lowered baseline 
activation in the antisaccade pathway (see also Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen and de Jong, 
2004). Whether arising from pathway-specific priming or goal neglect, we find that this effect 
frequently persisted beyond the timescale of a single trial: sequences of consecutive errors 
were common, and, critically, the probability of making an error on any given trial increased 
dramatically with the number of erroneous preceding trials (Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
It should be noted, that our observation of an increased probability of making an error 
following an error on the previous trial is opposite to the predictions made by the popular 
conflict monitoring account of antisaccade performance (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 
1968; Miller and Cohen, 2001).  
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Differential effects of slowly- and rapidly-corrected errors on the following primary saccade 
latency  
 
The conflict monitoring account of antisaccade performance predicts that an error would lead 
to slower response on the following trial (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 1968; Miller 
and Cohen, 2001). Indeed, in situations where conflict and cognitive control are high, slower 
responses are often found after an error (Rabbitt, 1966; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; Hodgson et 
al, 2004). Our data show that post-error slowing can be found in certain circumstances, but 
not in all situations. Post-error slowing was found for correct antisaccades on trials following 
an error that was corrected with a latency in excess of 150 ms on the previous trial. However, 
if the error on the previous trial was corrected rapidly (with a latency of less than 80 ms) no 
post-error slowing was observed; rather a post-error quickening was found. Why this 
differential influence of rapidly- and slowly-corrected errors might arise is beyond the scope 
of the present data.  
Our observation of an increased correct antisaccade latency only following slowly-
corrected errors may be because post-error slowing is restricted to trials following errors of 
which the participant is aware (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001) and consciously-recognised errors 
tend to have longer latencies (Mokler & Fischer, 1999).  
 The post-error quickening of correct antisaccade responses that we observed after 
rapidly corrected errors is an interesting and novel finding and cannot easily be accounted for 
within current accounts of antisaccade performance. One speculation concerns the anterior 
cingulated cortex (ACC): increased activation in the ACC is typically associated with error 
detection and conflict monitoring (e.g., Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann & Blanke, 1991; 
Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ & Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer & Donchin, 
1993; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), but has also recently been implicated in promoting a state of 
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increased general arousal (Critchley et al., 2003). It may be that increased activity in the ACC 
arising from error detection increases general arousal and thus elevates activity in both the 
prosaccade and antisaccade pathways.  
While for correct antisaccadic responses on the current trial a post-error slowing was 
found following slowly corrected errors and a post-error quickening was found following 
rapidly corrected errors; for erroneous prosaccades on the current trial the opposite pattern 
was observed: error latencies were increased slightly following rapidly corrected errors, and 
reduced slightly following slowly corrected errors. Current accounts of antisaccade 
performance do not predict this result and at present we can find no obvious explanations; it 
will be important to see whether it is replicated in future studies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The outcome of a trial can have pronounced influences upon antisaccade performance in the 
subsequent trial. Post-error slowing, predicted in many conflict monitoring accounts of 
antisaccade performance, is only observed for correct antisaccades following slowly corrected 
errors on the previous trial. If an error is corrected rapidly, no such post-error slowing is 
observed on the next trial; indeed in these situation post-error quickening ensues. Periods of 
goal neglect during the task are apparent that may span several trials: errors are likely to be 
followed by errors on the next trial and even for several successive trials. Repetition priming 
effects also influence antisaccade performance: after correct antisaccades, correct 
antisaccades into the same hemifield are promoted. Not only do our data allow us to consider 
the trial-by-trial modulation of the antisaccade task, but they also demonstrate the utility of 
multilevel modelling techniques for analysing antisaccade data. Using this technique it is 
possible to look at fine-grained differences between individual trials while also accounting for 
between-observer differences (both of these aspects are crucial components to account for in 
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the antisaccade task). Our data clearly demonstrate the need to consider trial-by-trial 
contingencies in any account of antisaccade performance, and suggest a similar requirement 
to account for such effects in models of ongoing cognitive control of behaviour. Further 
research employing detailed analyses of trial-by-trial contingencies  - in particular, 
considering effects across a series of consecutive trials - in antisaccade performance using 
techniques such as multilevel modelling will help develop our understanding of the cognitive 
processes underlying the ongoing monitoring and modification of task performance, and 
might provide important clues as to why and in what ways errors are increased in various 
clinical populations. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
FIGURE 1. The antisaccade task. The grey inset box shows a schematic of the trial sequence. 
A central fixation marker was visible for between 0.6 and 3.1 seconds. This was followed by 
a 200 ms gap period where no target was visible. After this the peripheral target appeared in 
one of four locations. In this schematic, the target appears 8 degrees to the left of fixation 
(alternative locations are shown by the dotted rings, but no such rings were visible to the 
observer). The plot shows example responses from trials on which the target appeared 8 
degrees to the left of fixation. Example recordings are shown for a correct antisaccade (black 
trace) and an erroneous antisaccade (grey trace). Note that the erroneous prosaccade depicted 
here was followed by a saccade in the opposite direction: to the target’s mirror location (after 
about 100 ms). Our three primary measures of antisaccade performance are also depicted on 
this plot. For correct antisaccades we measured the latency of the primary (antisaccade) 
response (LAS). For error prosaccades we measured the latency of the primary response (LEr) 
and then the latency with which the error was corrected (LCorr: the time between the end of the 
erroneous prosaccade and the start of the antisaccade). 
 
FIGURE 2. The influence of previous trial outcome and current trial outcome upon primary 
saccade latency. Correct antisaccades were generally slower than erroneous prosaccades. 
After a rapidly corrected error (light grey bars), correct antisaccades had shorter latencies than 
after a correct antisaccade on the previous trial (black bars); showing post-error quickening. 
After a slowly corrected error (dark grey bars), the latencies of correct antisaccades were 
longer than after correct antisaccades (black bars); showing post-error slowing. The opposite 
pattern of influence of slowly- and rapidly-corrected errors on primary saccade latency was 
observed following an erroneous prosaccade on the previous trial. 
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 Correct antisaccade 
on previous trial 
Rapidly corrected 
error prosaccade on 
previous trial 
Slowly corrected 
error prosaccade on 
previous trial 
Same hemifield as 
previous trial 19.86% 25.73% 26.19% 
Opposite hemifield 
to previous trial 25.75% 26.91% 28.99% 
 
 
TABLE 1. The influence of hemifield congruence upon error rates on trials following correct 
antisaccades, rapidly corrected errors (correction latency < 80 ms), or slowly corrected errors 
(correction latency > 150 ms). 
Trial by trial effects in the antisaccade task 
Tatler & Hutton 
27 
 
 
Error Sequence Length 1 2 3 4 5 6+ 
Number of  
Sequences 2158 521 162 81 35 41 
Probability of Making an 
Error .34 .44 .53 .56 .62 - 
 
 
TABLE 2. The frequencies with which sequences of consecutive errors were executed, and 
the probability of making an error after an error sequence of that length. Note that the 
frequencies refer to the number of discrete sequences of each length (e.g., there were 81 
instances were 4 consecutive errors were made before a correct trial) whereas the probabilities 
refer to the likelihood of an error occurring on the next trial after any error sequence of a 
given length (e.g. after 2 errors which may occur in a longer sequence of errors). 
 
 
 
